The Social Psychology of Democracies in Transition: 1989–2019
Introduction
Ben Stanley
Department of Social Sciences, SWPS University
March 5, 2026
Introduction to the course
What is this course about?
- This course examines what happens to people — their minds, identities, values, and social behaviour — when political systems change
- We focus on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE): the countries that transitioned from communist rule after 1989
- Social psychology provides the theoretical and methodological tools; CEE provides the empirical laboratory
- The course spans 13 lectures, each addressing a distinct dimension of post-communist social psychology
Lecture 1: Transition to (and from?) democracy
- “Transition to democracy” refers to the process by which authoritarian regimes give way to democratic ones
- In CEE, transition meant moving simultaneously from communist one-party rule and from centrally planned economies
- Countries faced this double transition with very different starting points: varying levels of prior reform, civil society development, and national cohesion
- Three decades on, the question mark in the title is deliberate: some CEE countries now show signs of backsliding from democracy
Lecture 1: The social consequences of transition
- Transition created enormous uncertainty at the individual level: job insecurity, identity disruption, value upheaval
- “Winners” and “losers” of transition were not evenly distributed: age, education, region, and sector all mattered
- The social costs of rapid marketisation — unemployment, inequality, loss of state provision — shaped attitudes to democracy for a generation
- Understanding these experiences is the foundation for everything else we study in this course
Lecture 2: Individual-level legacies of communism
- Communist regimes actively shaped the psychological dispositions of their citizens through socialisation, education, and the structures of everyday life
- The concept of a “communist mentality” captures traits that researchers have associated with life under communism:
- Dependence on the state for material security and life outcomes
- Low trust in institutions — especially those seen as captured by the party
- Conformity and self-censorship in public life, combined with a rich private sphere of dissent
- Egalitarian values in economic life, combined with cynicism about formal equality
Lecture 2: Has the communist mentality persisted?
- The key empirical question is whether these traits have persisted into the post-communist era — and if so, how
- Evidence suggests persistence is real but partial: attitudes differ by cohort (those socialised before vs. after 1989), by country, and by the nature of communist-era experiences
- Some traits may reflect not “legacy” but rational responses to post-communist realities: low trust makes sense where institutions are genuinely unreliable
- Whether a distinctively “post-communist” mentality is giving way to something new — a “post-postcommunist” psychology — is a central question for the later lectures
Lecture 3: Group-level legacies of communism
- Communist regimes paradoxically combined enforced collective participation (in party organisations, trade unions, volunteer activities) with the systematic destruction of genuine voluntary association
- Genuine civil society — autonomous, self-organised, not directed by the party — was suppressed or co-opted
- This left a distinctive legacy: populations that had been mobilised but not genuinely organised, and that had low trust in formal associations
Lecture 3: Civil society after communism
- After 1989, civil society developed unevenly across the region
- Some countries (Poland, Czech Republic) had pre-existing traditions of organised dissent (Solidarity, Charter 77) that provided a foundation for post-communist civil society
- Others lacked these resources and saw much weaker civic mobilisation
- Levels of associational participation, social trust, and collective action remain lower in most CEE countries than in Western Europe — a pattern with direct implications for democratic quality
Lecture 4: The self under and after communism
- Communist regimes sought to reshape social identities: promoting a collective “socialist” identity and suppressing national, religious, and class identities that competed with party loyalty
- In practice, this suppression was never complete: national and religious identities survived, often strengthened by the experience of repression
- The collapse of communism in 1989 triggered an “identity explosion” — the rapid re-emergence of previously suppressed identities and the formation of new ones
Lecture 4: Identity change over thirty years
- In the immediate post-communist period, identity politics was intense: questions of nationhood, religion, and historical memory dominated public debate
- Over time, identities have stabilised — but in ways that differ significantly across the region
- EU membership has created new frames of identification, with varying degrees of popular attachment
- We now see significant variation: some CEE publics have developed strongly European identities; others have seen a reassertion of nationalist and religious identities as counterweights to European integration
Lecture 5: Attitudes, values, orientations and beliefs
- The communist period bequeathed a distinctive attitudinal profile to CEE publics:
- High demand for state intervention in the economy
- Low trust in political institutions
- Ambivalence toward democracy: support in principle, scepticism in practice
- Stronger traditional and survival values (vs. self-expression and emancipative values) compared with Western Europe
Lecture 5: How have attitudes changed over time?
- Survey evidence (European Values Study, European Social Survey) shows gradual but uneven convergence with Western European patterns
- Economic development, EU accession, and generational replacement have all contributed to attitudinal change
- But convergence is not uniform: younger cohorts in CEE are more liberal on social issues but not necessarily more trusting of institutions
- The persistence of distinctive attitudinal patterns — and the re-emergence of some “traditional” values — raises questions about what “post-postcommunist” attitudes actually look like
Lecture 6: Social influence and social norms
- Norms of civic participation — what it means to be a “good citizen” — were radically reshaped by communist and post-communist experiences
- Under communism, formal civic participation was compulsory but empty; informal norms privileged loyalty to family and close networks over engagement with public institutions
- After 1989, new norms of democratic citizenship had to be learned — often in the absence of deep civic traditions
Lecture 6: Social remittances and norm change
- “Social remittances” refers to the transfer of norms, values, and behaviours through migration and cross-cultural contact
- As millions of CEE citizens moved to Western Europe for work, they were exposed to different norms of civic life, consumption, and interpersonal relations
- On return (or through ongoing contact), some of these norms have been transmitted back to CEE societies — with consequences for political attitudes, gender roles, and expectations of public institutions
- The internet and social media have accelerated this process of cultural exchange
Lecture 7: Anti-social behaviour — anomie and aggression
- The concept of “anomie” (Durkheim, Merton) describes a state in which social norms are weak, absent, or contested — producing disorientation, risk-taking, and deviance
- The collapse of communism created precisely these conditions: existing norms were discredited overnight, new norms had not yet stabilised, and rapid economic change produced extreme inequality and uncertainty
- Crime rates rose sharply in most CEE countries in the early 1990s; corruption became pervasive; trust in public institutions collapsed
Lecture 7: Comparing CEE and Western Europe
- Ulrich Beck’s concept of the “risk society” describes modern societies in which traditional structures no longer protect individuals from systemic risks — a description that fits post-communist CEE well
- CEE countries generally show higher levels of anomie-related indicators (corruption, crime, interpersonal aggression) than Western European comparators
- But the picture has improved significantly since the early 1990s, and there is wide variation within the region
- Understanding what has driven improvement — and what persistent factors maintain higher levels of anti-social behaviour — is a central empirical puzzle
Lecture 8: Pro-social behaviour — helping and altruism
- Pro-social behaviour — volunteering, charitable giving, helping strangers, cooperating with unknown others — tends to be lower in CEE than in Western Europe
- Several explanations have been proposed:
- Low social trust makes cooperation with strangers costly and risky
- The communist-era destruction of genuine voluntary association left weak habits of civic cooperation
- Economic insecurity reduces the “surplus” available for altruistic giving
Lecture 8: Is the picture changing?
- There is evidence of growth in volunteering and charitable giving in some CEE countries, particularly among younger and better-educated cohorts
- EU accession and engagement with European civil society organisations may have stimulated pro-social norms
- However, the relationship between economic development and pro-social behaviour is not linear: rising inequality can reduce solidarity even as average incomes rise
- The challenge is to identify which mechanisms are driving change — and which are holding it back
Lecture 9: Groups and group dynamics
- Groups are the basic unit of social life — and understanding how they form, develop, and function is central to social psychology
- Key processes include:
- Social facilitation: how the presence of others affects individual performance
- Conformity and social pressure: how group norms are maintained
- Social loafing: the tendency to exert less effort in group settings
- Group development: how groups move through stages of forming, norming, storming, and performing
Lecture 9: Groups in post-communist context
- Post-communist societies have been laboratories for the study of group dynamics: new political parties, social movements, and civil society organisations formed rapidly after 1989
- Leadership styles have been a particular focus: the collapse of communist authority created both a vacuum and an opportunity for new forms of leadership
- Charismatic and populist leadership styles have flourished in contexts of low institutional trust and high uncertainty
- Understanding the psychological dynamics of group formation and leadership helps explain the rise of populist movements across the region
Lecture 10: The nature of post-communist prejudice
- Prejudice — negative attitudes toward members of outgroups — is a well-documented feature of CEE societies
- Groups that have historically been targets of prejudice in CEE include: Roma, Jewish communities, LGBTQ+ individuals, and more recently, migrants and refugees
- Survey data consistently show higher levels of prejudice toward these groups in CEE than in Western Europe — though the gap has narrowed somewhat over time
Lecture 10: Explaining post-communist prejudice
- Communist regimes had a paradoxical relationship with prejudice: official ideology was internationalist and anti-racist, but in practice ethnic minorities were often scapegoated and discriminated against
- After 1989, the removal of official constraints on expression allowed latent prejudices to surface
- The anxieties of rapid social change — economic insecurity, identity disruption, status threat — have provided fertile ground for prejudice to develop and persist
- The legacies of communism interact with more general psychological mechanisms (social identity theory, realistic group conflict) to produce distinctive patterns of prejudice in CEE
Lecture 11: Reducing prejudice in CEE
- Efforts to reduce prejudice in CEE have taken several forms:
- Legislative: anti-discrimination laws, EU equality directives, hate speech legislation
- Educational: school-based programmes promoting intercultural understanding
- Contact-based: structured contact between majority and minority group members, drawing on Allport’s contact hypothesis
- Civil society: NGO-led campaigns, media engagement, community projects
Lecture 11: Evidence and challenges
- The contact hypothesis predicts that positive intergroup contact reduces prejudice — but the conditions required (equal status, cooperation, institutional support) are often absent in CEE contexts
- Legislative approaches face implementation challenges, particularly where judicial independence is weak
- Civil society-based efforts have had mixed results, partly because of the weakness of civil society in many CEE countries
- Democratic backsliding has, in some cases, actively reversed progress: governments in Hungary and Poland have rolled back anti-discrimination protections and pursued policies that intensify prejudice toward minorities
Lecture 12: Cultural social psychology and intercultural relations
- Cultural social psychology asks how culture shapes psychological processes — and how psychological processes in turn shape culture
- Key frameworks include:
- Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (individualism-collectivism; power distance; uncertainty avoidance)
- Inglehart’s value survey work, distinguishing traditional/secular and survival/self-expression values
- Triandis’s work on subjective culture and cultural syndromes
Lecture 12: Is there a CEE culture?
- The CEE region shows a degree of cultural coherence on cross-national surveys: lower individualism, higher power distance, and stronger survival values than Western Europe
- But the region is also highly differentiated: Baltic states, Visegrad countries, and Balkan states differ significantly in their cultural profiles
- The role of religion (Catholic vs. Orthodox traditions) and historical experience (Habsburg vs. Ottoman legacy) produces important within-region variation
- EU integration has intensified cross-cultural contact and created new pressures for cultural convergence — with contested and uneven results
Lecture 13: Democratic attitudes and democratic backsliding
- Survey evidence from Eurobarometer, the European Social Survey, and regional barometers shows complex and sometimes contradictory patterns:
- Majorities in CEE endorse democracy as a form of government in the abstract
- But satisfaction with how democracy works in practice is much lower
- And support for “strong leader” solutions is higher than in Western Europe
- These patterns matter because they may create psychological openings for authoritarian politics
Lecture 13: The psychology of democratic backsliding
- “Democratic backsliding” — the gradual erosion of democratic norms and institutions by elected governments — has been most pronounced in Hungary and Poland
- Psychological factors that may facilitate backsliding include:
- Authoritarian personality traits: preference for order, deference to strong leaders, hostility to outgroups
- Communist nostalgia: selective positive memory of communist-era security and predictability
- Populist attitudes: distrust of elites, identification with “the people,” hostility to pluralism
- Social psychology helps explain not just institutional change but why ordinary citizens support — or fail to resist — democratic erosion
Assessment: end-of-semester test
- The test will consist of 40 multiple-choice questions
- At least one question from each of the 13 topics
- The basis of the questions: lecture slides and course readings
- Test results will be translated into a percentage score and graded as follows:
| Grade | Score |
|---|---|
| Very good (5,0) | 91–100% |
| Good plus (4,5) | 81–90% |
| Good (4,0) | 71–80% |
| Satisfactory plus (3,5) | 61–70% |
| Satisfactory (3,0) | 51–60% |
| Unsatisfactory (2,0) | ≤ 50% |
Initial test
Initial test
- Which of the following countries is not one of the countries of the region generally known as Central and Eastern Europe?
- A. Poland
- B. Hungary
- C. Greece
- D. Slovenia
Initial test
- Which of the following countries is not one of the countries of the region generally known as Central and Eastern Europe?
- A. Poland
- B. Hungary
- C. Greece
- D. Slovenia
Initial test
- In which year did the process of transition to democracy begin in Central and Eastern Europe?
- A. 2004
- B. 1981
- C. 1989
- D. 1991
Initial test
- In which year did the process of transition to democracy begin in Central and Eastern Europe?
- A. 2004
- B. 1981
- C. 1989
- D. 1991
Initial test
- Which of the following CEE countries joined the European Union in 2004?
- A. Slovakia
- B. Serbia
- C. Romania
- D. Bulgaria
Initial test
- Which of the following CEE countries joined the European Union in 2004?
- A. Slovakia
- B. Serbia
- C. Romania
- D. Bulgaria
Initial test
- Which of the following countries has, according to several organisations which monitor the quality of democracy, experienced “democratic backsliding” over the last decade?
- A. Czech Republic
- B. Lithuania
- C. Estonia
- D. Hungary
Initial test
- Which of the following countries has, according to several organisations which monitor the quality of democracy, experienced “democratic backsliding” over the last decade?
- A. Czech Republic
- B. Lithuania
- C. Estonia
- D. Hungary
Initial test
- Which CEE country is the largest recipient of funding from the European Union?
- A. Slovenia
- B. Latvia
- C. Poland
- D. Slovakia
Initial test
- Which CEE country is the largest recipient of funding from the European Union?
- A. Slovenia
- B. Latvia
- C. Poland
- D. Slovakia
Initial test
- Which CEE country currently has the highest GDP per capita?
- A. Romania
- B. Czech Republic
- C. Poland
- D. Bulgaria
Initial test
- Which CEE country currently has the highest GDP per capita?
- A. Romania
- B. Czech Republic
- C. Poland
- D. Bulgaria
Initial test
- Which of the following individuals has not been president of a CEE country?
- A. Traian Băsescu
- B. Jarosław Kaczyński
- C. Dalia Grybauskaite
- D. Václav Havel
Initial test
- Which of the following individuals has not been president of a CEE country?
- A. Traian Băsescu
- B. Jarosław Kaczyński
- C. Dalia Grybauskaite
- D. Václav Havel
Initial test
- Which of the following countries was not formerly part of Yugoslavia?
- A. Macedonia
- B. Croatia
- C. Romania
- D. Slovenia
Initial test
- Which of the following countries was not formerly part of Yugoslavia?
- A. Macedonia
- B. Croatia
- C. Romania
- D. Slovenia
Initial test
- What did the term “Eastern Bloc” refer to?
- A. The group of communist states of Central and Eastern Europe
- B. The countries that used to belong to the Soviet Union
- C. The wall that separated the two halves of Berlin
- D. The military alliance of communist countries during the Cold War
Initial test
- What did the term “Eastern Bloc” refer to?
- A. The group of communist states of Central and Eastern Europe
- B. The countries that used to belong to the Soviet Union
- C. The wall that separated the two halves of Berlin
- D. The military alliance of communist countries during the Cold War
Initial test
- Which of the following was not a characteristic of the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe?
- A. Free and fair elections
- B. Centrally-controlled economies
- C. State censorship
- D. Restrictions on free enterprise
Initial test
- Which of the following was not a characteristic of the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe?
- A. Free and fair elections
- B. Centrally-controlled economies
- C. State censorship
- D. Restrictions on free enterprise
Initial test
- Which of the following was not a demand of Poland’s Solidarity movement?
- A. Freedom of speech for the press and publications
- B. The release of political prisoners
- C. Acceptance of the right of free trade unions to exist
- D. Free and fair democratic elections
Initial test
- Which of the following was not a demand of Poland’s Solidarity movement?
- A. Freedom of speech for the press and publications
- B. The release of political prisoners
- C. Acceptance of the right of free trade unions to exist
- D. Free and fair democratic elections
Initial test
- Which of the following was not a reason for the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe losing power?
- A. The emergence of profound economic problems
- B. Societies losing faith in communist ideology
- C. The threat of war breaking out between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe
- D. The absence of leaders capable of reforming communist regimes
Initial test
- Which of the following was not a reason for the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe losing power?
- A. The emergence of profound economic problems
- B. Societies losing faith in communist ideology
- C. The threat of war breaking out between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe
- D. The absence of leaders capable of reforming communist regimes
Initial test
- Which of the following countries of Central and Eastern Europe is not a democracy?
- A. Slovakia
- B. Lithuania
- C. Croatia
- D. Belarus
Initial test
- Which of the following countries of Central and Eastern Europe is not a democracy?
- A. Slovakia
- B. Lithuania
- C. Croatia
- D. Belarus
Initial test
- Which of the following countries of Central and Eastern Europe has the lowest level of GDP?
- A. Estonia
- B. Moldova
- C. Slovenia
- D. Poland
Initial test
- Which of the following countries of Central and Eastern Europe has the lowest level of GDP?
- A. Estonia
- B. Moldova
- C. Slovenia
- D. Poland
Initial test
- The group of countries generally referred to as ‘the Baltic States’ consists of…
- A. Poland, Estonia and Kaliningrad
- B. Finland, Estonia and Lithuania
- C. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
- D. Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia
Initial test
- The group of countries generally referred to as ‘the Baltic States’ consists of…
- A. Poland, Estonia and Kaliningrad
- B. Finland, Estonia and Lithuania
- C. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
- D. Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia
Initial test
- Which of the following groups of countries comprises the Visegrad Group?
- A. Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary and Slovenia
- B. Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia
- C. Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia and Austria
- D. Austria, Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria
Initial test
- Which of the following groups of countries comprises the Visegrad Group?
- A. Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary and Slovenia
- B. Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia
- C. Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia and Austria
- D. Austria, Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria
Initial test
- Which of the following countries is not in the Balkans?
- A. Croatia
- B. Bosnia
- C. Slovakia
- D. Serbia
Initial test
- Which of the following countries is not in the Balkans?
- A. Croatia
- B. Bosnia
- C. Slovakia
- D. Serbia
Initial test
- In which of the following countries of Central and Eastern Europe is one of the major political parties called Fidesz?
- A. Hungary
- B. Romania
- C. Slovenia
- D. Serbia
Initial test
- In which of the following countries of Central and Eastern Europe is one of the major political parties called Fidesz?
- A. Hungary
- B. Romania
- C. Slovenia
- D. Serbia
Initial test
- Bratislava is the capital of which country of Central and Eastern Europe?
- A. Austria
- B. Romania
- C. Slovenia
- D. Slovakia
Initial test
- Bratislava is the capital of which country of Central and Eastern Europe?
- A. Austria
- B. Romania
- C. Slovenia
- D. Slovakia
Initial test
- What is meant by the process of “lustration” that many countries of Central and Eastern Europe implemented during the 1990s?
- A. The removal of communists from power
- B. The implementation of a market economy
- C. The publicising of the truth about individuals’ past collaboration with the secret services
- D. The process of drafting and passing democratic constitutions
Initial test
- What is meant by the process of “lustration” that many countries of Central and Eastern Europe implemented during the 1990s?
- A. The removal of communists from power
- B. The implementation of a market economy
- C. The publicising of the truth about individuals’ past collaboration with the secret services
- D. The process of drafting and passing democratic constitutions
Social Psychology of Democracies in Transition (PE.S11.T28)