The Social Psychology of Democracies in Transition: 1989–2019

Legacies of communism

Ben Stanley

Department of Social Sciences, SWPS University

March 19, 2026

Today’s topics

Overview of today’s lecture

  • What are historical legacies?
  • What kinds of legacies have been studied in CEE?
  • Living through communism
  • Living in a post-communist country

Introduction

Why do legacies matter? Pop-Eleches & Tucker’s starting point

  • Post-communist citizens are, on average, less supportive of democracy and markets, and more supportive of state-provided welfare, than citizens elsewhere (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, Fig. 1.1)
  • The intuitive answer is that this is somehow a legacy of communism — but how?
  • Pop-Eleches & Tucker distinguish two candidate explanations:
    • Attitudes may be a function of living through communism (direct exposure to communist rule)
    • Attitudes may be a function of living in a post-communist country (present contextual factors)
  • These are related but not the same thing — and they have very different implications for how we understand attitudinal differences, how long we expect them to persist, and what role communist legacies actually play

Post-communist attitudinal differences (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, Fig. 1.1)

  • Using World Values Survey data (waves 2–5), Pop-Eleches & Tucker show post-communist citizens differ from non-post-communist citizens across four attitude domains:
    • Democracy support: significantly lower
    • Market support: significantly lower
    • Welfare state support: significantly higher
    • Gender equality support: slightly lower (not statistically significant)
  • These differences motivate the core question: why do post-communist citizens hold systematically different attitudes — and is it communism that is responsible?

Voting for Law and Justice, 2023

Voting for Civic Coalition, 2023

Polish railway network, 1952/53

Percentage of houses without indoor toilet

What are historical legacies?

Three components of a legacy

  • Pop-Eleches & Tucker note the concept of “communist legacies” appears ~1,700 times on Google Scholar, yet there is no clearly established theoretical or empirical blueprint for analysing legacy effects on attitudes
  • The notion of a legacy contains three basic components:
    • An outcome: a situation not fully explicable by present circumstances
    • An antecedent: a past event or process identified as a cause
    • A mechanism: the process linking antecedent to outcome
  • Crucially, legacies are after-effects of defunct causes — the mechanism no longer operates, yet the effect persists

Component 1: Outcome

  • Outcome
    • A situation that is not fully explicable given present circumstances.
    • For example, why should patterns of voting in Poland vary to some extent across lines of partition, given current conditions?
    • There is no “Former Prussian Partition Party”, or “Former Austrian Partition Party”

Component 2: Antecedent

  • Antecedent
    • A past event, tendency, process, reality etc. that is identified as a cause or a correlate of the outcome.
    • For example, higher levels of voting for conservative parties in Poland can be observed in areas that formerly belonged to the Russian and (in particular) Austrian partitions.

Component 3: Mechanism

  • Mechanism
    • This is a process that links the antecedent to the outcome.
    • If we observe that voting for conservative parties in Poland is more frequent in areas that once belonged to the Russian or Austrian empires, then how can we explain this?
    • One theory is that the particularly high level of voting for conservative parties in the areas of the former Austrian empire is a legacy of the nature of that empire.
    • Compared with other partitioning forces, it was more tolerant of the Roman Catholic Church.
    • Greater religious tolerance led to higher church attendance, which led in turn to more conservative social attitudes.

Legacies as after-effects of defunct causes

  • What is crucial about these legacies is that they derive from explanatory mechanisms that no longer operate.
  • They are after-effects of causes that persist when the cause is no longer in operation.
  • In this sense we can say that the past is influencing the present.
  • For example, arguments about the low level of trust in authorities shown by people in countries that used to have authoritarian governments are based on the argument that the legacy of state repression and domination continues to exert an effect, even when that repression and domination is no longer active.

The effects of legacies

What kinds of legacies have been studied in CEE?

Cultural legacies: an overview

  • Cultural
    • Avoidance of politics
    • Low levels of trust
    • Low support for liberal social values
    • Economic beliefs
    • Nationalist views
    • Low levels of civic participation

Cultural legacies in CEE

  • Collective trauma and historical memory
    • Decades of repression, surveillance, and state violence created deep societal wounds
    • Public discourse often focused on victimhood narratives
  • Nostalgia for communist-era stability
    • “Ostalgie” in Eastern Germany and similar phenomena elsewhere
    • Selective remembering of social benefits while downplaying oppression
  • Interrupted cultural development
    • Cultural expression restricted to state-approved forms
    • Limited cultural exchange with Western world created distinct aesthetic sensibilities

Avoidance of politics

  • Causes:
    • Political participation under communism was often coerced or performative
    • Disillusionment with manipulated political processes
    • Association of politics with corruption and dishonesty
  • Post-communist manifestations:
    • Lower voter turnout compared to established Western democracies
    • Reluctance to join political parties or movements
    • Preference for technocratic governance over ideological politics
    • Vulnerability to populist appeals promising to “clean up” political systems

Low levels of trust

  • Causes:
    • Widespread surveillance by secret police (Stasi, Securitate, StB, etc.)
    • Informant networks that penetrated families and social circles
    • Arbitrary application of law and unpredictable state actions
  • Post-communist manifestations:
    • Lower interpersonal trust compared to Western Europe
    • Weak social capital and limited civic networks
    • High distrust of government institutions and officials
    • Reliance on close personal networks rather than formal institutions
    • Difficulties in establishing rule of law and tackling corruption

Low support for liberal social values

  • Causes:
    • Official promotion of conservative family models despite progressive rhetoric
    • Religious suppression leading to religious identity as form of resistance
    • Limited exposure to global social movements and debates
  • Post-communist manifestations:
    • More traditional attitudes toward gender roles
    • Greater resistance to LGBTQ+ rights compared to Western Europe
    • Revival of religious influence in public life
    • Conservative backlash against perceived Western cultural imperialism
    • Framing of liberal values as “foreign” or “imposed” ideologies

Economic beliefs

  • Causes:
    • Experience with command economy and state ownership
    • Economic hardships during transition to market economy
    • Uneven distribution of benefits from privatisation
  • Post-communist manifestations:
    • Ambivalent attitudes toward free markets
    • Support for strong welfare states and economic security
    • Resentment toward oligarchs who benefited from privatisation
    • Skepticism of foreign economic influence
    • Nostalgia for guaranteed employment and social services
    • Higher acceptance of state intervention in strategic sectors

Nationalist views

  • Causes:
    • Suppression of national identities under internationalist communist ideology
    • Use of nationalism as form of resistance against Soviet domination
    • Post-1989 vacuum of unifying ideology
  • Post-communist manifestations:
    • Resurgence of ethnic and national identities after 1989
    • Border disputes and ethnic tensions (Yugoslavia being most extreme case)
    • Nation-building projects centered on pre-communist historical narratives
    • Strong emphasis on sovereignty in EU relations
    • Resistance to immigration and multiculturalism
    • Political mobilization around ethnonational identities

Low levels of civic participation

  • Causes:
    • Forced participation in state-controlled organizations
    • Suspicion of collective action outside close personal networks
    • Habits of passive resistance rather than active engagement
  • Post-communist manifestations:
    • Weaker civil society organizations compared to Western Europe
    • Lower rates of volunteering and charitable giving
    • Difficulties in sustaining grassroots movements
    • Greater reliance on foreign funding for NGO activities
    • Limited citizen engagement in policy-making processes
    • Development of “NGO elites” disconnected from broader society

Regional variations and exceptions

  • Different degrees of communist control:
    • Yugoslavia’s more open system vs. Romania’s extreme repression
  • Pre-communist legacies:
    • Central European vs. Eastern European historical experiences
  • Success of transition:
    • Baltic states and Czech Republic vs. slower reforms elsewhere
  • EU integration effects:
    • Convergence with Western norms in some areas
  • Recent democratic backsliding:
    • Hungary and Poland challenging the narrative of inevitable liberalization

Interactions between legacies

  • These legacies reinforce each other:
    • Low trust → Low civic participation
    • Nationalist views → Skepticism of liberal values
    • Avoidance of politics → Vulnerability to populism
  • The combination creates distinct post-communist political cultures
    • “Empty formalism” in institutional development
    • Gap between formal rules and informal practices
    • Hybrid political systems that combine democratic and authoritarian elements

Material legacies: an overview

  • Material
    • Lack of infrastructure
    • The destruction of the environment
    • The dominance of the state sector
    • Excessive focus on heavy industry

Lack of infrastructure

  • Causes:
    • Prioritisation of industrial development over public infrastructure
    • Central planning inefficiencies and resource misallocation
    • Focus on quantity over quality in construction
    • Deferred maintenance due to chronic budget constraints
  • Post-communist manifestations:
    • Aging transportation networks (railroads, roads, bridges)
    • Deteriorating housing stock in panel block buildings
    • Outdated urban utilities (water, heating, electrical systems)
    • Digital infrastructure gaps compared to Western Europe
    • Substantial infrastructure investment needs upon EU accession
    • Regional disparities between capital cities and rural areas

Environmental destruction

  • Causes:
    • Disregard for environmental concerns in industrial planning
    • Absence of effective environmental regulations
    • Ideological belief in man’s domination over nature
    • Production targets prioritised over ecological considerations
  • Post-communist manifestations:
    • Notorious ecological disaster zones
    • Toxic industrial sites requiring expensive remediation
    • Legacy pollution in soil and groundwater
    • Health effects in populations near industrial centers
    • High energy intensity and carbon emissions per GDP unit
    • Environmental cleanup costs affecting economic transition

Dominance of state sector

  • Causes:
    • Ideological commitment to state ownership
    • Nationalisation of virtually all economic assets
    • Limited private economic initiative allowed (varying by country)
    • Bureaucratic management of economy through ministries and planning agencies
  • Post-communist manifestations:
    • Challenges of privatisation (corruption, asset-stripping)
    • Continued state ownership in strategic sectors
    • Weak private entrepreneurial traditions
    • Path dependencies in economic organisation
    • Public expectations of state economic intervention
    • Difficulties in establishing effective corporate governance

Excessive focus on heavy industry

  • Causes:
    • Soviet-inspired industrialization model
    • Ideological emphasis on working class and industrial production
    • Military-industrial complex priorities
    • COMECON specialization and trade patterns
  • Post-communist manifestations:
    • Outdated industrial plants requiring modernization or closure
    • Environmental damage around industrial centers
    • Regional economic crises in former industrial areas
    • Skills mismatches in labor force
    • Difficult transitions to service and knowledge economies
    • Industrial restructuring costs (economic and social)

Institutional legacies: an overview

  • Institutional
    • The persistence of old regime institutions and organisations throughout the economy, polity, and society
      • Large welfare systems
      • Weak party systems
      • Communist-era constitutions
      • Centralised economic planning

Persistence of old regime elements

  • Causes:
    • Path dependency and institutional inertia
    • Lack of alternative models immediately available
    • Role of former elites in transition process
    • Pragmatic need for institutional continuity during transition
  • Post-communist manifestations:
    • Formal institutions with new names but similar practices
    • Personnel continuity in bureaucracy, judiciary, and security services
    • Adaptation rather than elimination of old structures
    • “Recombinant property” mixing state and private ownership
    • Informal networks maintaining influence across regime change

Large welfare systems

  • Causes:
    • Socialist ideological commitment to social provision
    • Employment-based benefits as form of social control
    • Legitimation strategy for authoritarian regimes
    • “Social contract” offering welfare in exchange for political compliance
  • Post-communist manifestations:
    • Extensive but underfunded welfare systems
    • Universal healthcare systems facing quality and financing challenges
    • Generous pension systems creating fiscal pressures
    • Public expectations of comprehensive social protection
    • Reform resistance from beneficiaries and providers
    • Social policy as key political battleground

Weak party systems

  • Causes:
    • One-party dominance undermining political pluralism
    • Politics organized around opposition to regime rather than policy differences
    • Limited experience with democratic party competition
    • Suppression of civil society organisations that could form party bases
  • Post-communist manifestations:
    • High electoral volatility and party system instability
    • Personality-driven rather than program-based parties
    • Weak party organisation and membership
    • Frequent emergence of “new” anti-establishment parties
    • Difficulties in forming stable governing coalitions
    • Vulnerability to populist and anti-system movements

Centralised administrative structures

  • Causes:
    • Centralised economic planning requiring administrative control
    • Democratic centralism as organisational principle
    • Limited local autonomy under communist governance
    • Bureaucratic coordination rather than market mechanisms
  • Post-communist manifestations:
    • Continued executive dominance over decision-making
    • Hesitant and incomplete decentralization reforms
    • Administrative bottlenecks and inefficiencies
    • Formal vs. informal decision-making processes
    • Weak local government capacity
    • Top-down implementation of EU-prompted reforms

Mutually reinforcing effects

  • Mutually reinforcing effects:
    • Infrastructure gaps → Perpetuate regional divisions and nationalist tensions
    • Environmental damage → Fosters distrust in institutions and political cynicism
    • State economic dominance → Shapes economic beliefs and business practices
    • Industrial decline → Feeds nostalgia and undermines trust in market reforms
    • Weak party systems → Enhance personalised politics and low trust
    • Welfare expectations → Influence economic beliefs and electoral politics

Specific cross-legacy interactions

  • Specific interactions:
    • Material deprivation during transition → Strengthened nationalist narratives
    • Environmental movements → Provided early civic participation opportunities
    • Privatisation experiences → Deepened distrust of political elites and reforms
    • Regional economic disparities → Exacerbated low social trust and political polarization
    • Institutional continuity → Maintained networks that hindered trust-building

Generational dimensions of legacies

  • Generational dimensions:
    • Older generations experienced both systems directly
    • Younger generations inherit cultural attitudes without material experiences
    • Different perspectives on trade-offs between security and opportunity

Multiple eras, multiple legacies

  • There are clearly a variety of legacies that are of potential importance when thinking about individual and group-level aspects of social behaviour in post-communist states.
  • Even if we limit our point of departure to the 19th century, we still have several distinct eras which might have given rise to different kinds of legacies.
    • The era of empire
    • The interwar period
    • The Second World War
    • The communist era
    • The early years of transition from communism

Living through communism

Living through communism: Pop-Eleches & Tucker’s primary explanation

  • Pop-Eleches & Tucker’s main empirical finding: attitudes toward democracy, markets, and welfare are better explained by living through communism than by living in a post-communist country
  • The core mechanism: communist regimes actively attempted to create a “Socialist Man”
    • Citizens were not merely expected to accept communist rule, but to embrace and embody its precepts
    • Schools, workplaces, and party meetings were active sites of political socialisation
    • Unlike most authoritarian regimes, communist states took active steps to make sure these precepts were adopted — not just compliance, but genuine attitude change
  • Each additional year under communist rule should increase alignment with pro-regime attitudes: less support for democracy and markets; more support for state welfare
  • But exposure is not equal: Pop-Eleches & Tucker introduce intensity and resistance as modifiers

Intensity and resistance to communist exposure

  • Not all years of communist exposure are equivalent — Pop-Eleches & Tucker use a sunburn analogy:
    • Temporal exposure = years lived under communist rule (the primary factor)
    • Intensity = how strong the “dose” of regime socialisation was
      • Country level: Stalinist vs. post-totalitarian regimes delivered very different messages
      • Individual level: attending secondary school under communism intensifies exposure
    • Resistance = factors buffering against regime socialisation
      • Country level: higher pre-communist literacy enabled resistance via nationalist narratives (Darden & Grzymala-Busse)
      • Individual level: Catholicism as an alternative community hostile to communist precepts
  • These modifiers help explain why communist legacies vary across individuals and countries, and point to the mechanisms by which exposure shaped attitudes

Living in a post-communist country

Living in a post-communist country: the alternative explanation

  • Even without communist exposure, post-communist citizens might differ from others because of the countries they currently live in — Pop-Eleches & Tucker identify three categories of present-day factors:
    • Sociodemographic makeup: e.g., the distribution of education and income in society
    • Economic conditions: e.g., falling real incomes during the transition to markets
    • Political institutions: e.g., the type of government citizens interact with day to day
  • Pre-communist conditions also matter: wealth, literacy, urbanisation, religious tradition, prior regime type may explain attitudinal divergence independently of communism
  • Pop-Eleches & Tucker’s empirical contribution: showing these contextual factors are less important than direct exposure in explaining the four attitude domains they study — though disentangling communist-era from post-communist influences requires care