Attitudes, values, orientations and beliefs
The Social Psychology of Democracies in Transition
The challenges of transition
Post-communist transition was a project of extraordinary complexity that required the simultaneous transformation of three distinct domains of social organisation. The closest historical analogy — the post-war democratisation of West Germany, Japan and Italy — did not involve a comparable shift from state planning to markets, and theorists such as Claus Offe argued that the combination of transformations created a particularly dangerous “dilemma of simultaneity” in which painful economic reform had to be carried out by newly accountable democratic governments.
| Dimension | Core tasks | Typical tensions |
|---|---|---|
| Political | Building democratic institutions, systems of representation, rule of law, judicial independence, an autonomous civil society, and integration with European and Atlantic bodies. | Creating functioning institutions while populations had little practical experience of democratic politics. |
| Economic | Liberalising prices, privatising state enterprise, dismantling subsidies, and attempting to “catch up with the West”. | Short-term pain concentrated on specific social and occupational groups whose votes were nevertheless required to sustain reform. |
| Socio-cultural | Absorbing rapid “Westernisation” of consumption, media and values while managing the resurgence of nationalist, religious and ethnic identities. | Rapid cultural change coinciding with material insecurity and the collapse of familiar identity categories. |
These three dimensions were deeply interconnected: progress or failure in one domain had consequences for the others, and the social-psychological theories studied earlier in the course provide an indispensable toolkit for interpreting how citizens experienced and evaluated these transformations.
Attitudes to transition
Thirty years on, there is considerable support in the region for both multiparty democracy and market economies, but the level of approval varies substantially from west to east.
| Country | Approve multiparty system (%) | Approve market economy (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Poland | 85 | 85 |
| East Germany | 85 | 83 |
| Czech Republic | 82 | 76 |
| Slovakia | 74 | 71 |
| Hungary | 72 | 70 |
| Lithuania | 70 | 69 |
| Bulgaria | 55 | 54 |
| Ukraine | 51 | 47 |
| Russia | 43 | 38 |
These aggregate figures conceal significant socio-demographic variation. Young people are consistently more likely than older people to approve of transition changes: in Slovakia 84% of those aged 18–34 support the change to a capitalist economy, compared with only 49% of those aged 60 and over. Higher education and higher income are likewise consistently associated with more positive evaluations of both political and economic transition, a pattern consistent with the relative deprivation and social identity frameworks — those who have benefited most materially from transition are most likely to evaluate it positively, while those who have lost status or economic security tend to evaluate it more negatively.
One of the most striking single data points is the change between 2009 and 2019 in the proportion of citizens across the region who say ordinary people have benefited “a great deal” or “a fair amount” from the changes since 1989: this figure rose from 21% in 2009 to 41% in 2019. The improvement is substantial, but the fact that nearly 60% of citizens still felt that ordinary people had not benefited from three decades of transition is a powerful reminder of the depth of the distributional grievances that transition created. The perceived benefits of transition are also unevenly distributed across domains: citizens in most countries are more positive about effects on the standard of living and education than about effects on law and order, health care and family values.
Democratic values
Across Europe there is striking agreement about which political institutions and rights are most important to have in a democratic society. When presented with nine factors — a fair judiciary, gender equality, free speech, regular elections, free internet, a free media, free political opposition, freedom of civil society and freedom of religion — majorities in every country say each is at least somewhat important. The formal endorsement of democratic values is not in doubt.
What differs between Western and Central and Eastern European respondents is the intensity of that endorsement. Western Europeans are consistently more likely to say each factor is “very important” for their country. The gap is largest for the more demanding institutions — a fair and independent judiciary and gender equality attract particularly large differences in intensity of endorsement.
| % saying factor is “very important” | Poland | Slovakia | Lithuania | EU median | Russia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fair judiciary | 72 | 69 | 69 | 87 | 63 |
| Gender equality | 69 | 67 | 62 | 85 | 54 |
| Free speech | 61 | 60 | 64 | 74 | 45 |
| Regular elections | 63 | 61 | 57 | 70 | 40 |
| Free media | 64 | 56 | 59 | 67 | 38 |
| Free opposition | 49 | 51 | 47 | 60 | 23 |
| Free civil society | 57 | 49 | 55 | 59 | 31 |
This pattern is consistent with both the social learning and the system justification frameworks. Post-communist citizens have learned the formal vocabulary of democratic values, while deep internalisation of those values as genuine personal commitments — rather than as normative statements one is expected to make — remains more variable. The gap is politically consequential: a population that is less intensely committed to judicial independence is a population that offers less resistance to attacks on that independence of the kind seen in Poland and Hungary in the 2010s.
Democratic satisfaction
Satisfaction with democracy across Europe is highly variable and does not follow a simple Western-versus-Eastern pattern. In Greece, the UK, Italy, Spain and France majorities were dissatisfied in 2019, reflecting the specific political and economic crises those countries had experienced. Among post-communist countries, Poland stood at about two-thirds satisfied — the highest in the survey — while Bulgaria stood at only 27%.
| Country | % satisfied with democracy, 2009 | 2019 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lithuania | 35 | 59 | +24 |
| Hungary | 21 | 45 | +24 |
| Poland | 53 | 66 | +13 |
| Ukraine | 21 | 34 | +13 |
| Czech Republic | 49 | 57 | +8 |
| Bulgaria | 21 | 27 | +6 |
| Slovakia | 50 | 52 | +2 |
| Russia | 30 | 32 | –2 |
Other indicators of political efficacy and system legitimacy paint a mixed picture. A minority in most countries agrees that most elected officials care what people like them think: in Poland only 45% agree (up from 24% in 1991), down from a high of around 45% that nevertheless exceeds the 28% recorded in the UK. On the proposition that “the state is run for the benefit of all the people”, Slovakia registers 88% agreement while Ukraine registers only 15%. Voting as a mechanism of political voice is more positively evaluated: in Poland 71% now agree that voting gives people like them some say in how the government runs things, up from 41% in 1991, while France and Bulgaria show substantial declines over the same period.
These patterns illustrate a paradox central to many post-communist democracies: citizens can be simultaneously satisfied with democratic outcomes in their country and relatively indifferent to or unaware of institutional erosion. Satisfaction with democratic performance is partly a function of how one’s preferred party is doing in government, which means it is not a reliable indicator of deeper commitment to democratic norms.
Attitudes towards the EU
European Union membership is viewed favourably by large majorities across the post-communist EU member states, often more favourably than in several Western European countries.
| Country | Favourable view of EU (%) | Unfavourable (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Poland | 84 | 14 |
| Lithuania | 83 | 12 |
| Bulgaria | 77 | 20 |
| Sweden | 72 | 26 |
| Slovakia | 70 | 26 |
| Germany | 69 | 28 |
| Hungary | 67 | 25 |
| Spain | 66 | 33 |
| Netherlands | 66 | 34 |
| UK | 54 | 44 |
| Greece | 53 | 44 |
| Czech Republic | 52 | 43 |
| France | 51 | 47 |
| Ukraine (non-EU) | 79 | 11 |
| Russia (non-EU) | 37 | 44 |
A separate question on whether membership has been “a good thing” confirms the pattern: 74% of Germans and 67% of Poles say yes, and even in the Czech Republic — the most Eurosceptic post-communist EU member surveyed — 40% say membership has been a good thing against 20% who say it has been bad. Trend data since 2009 show that EU support has been relatively stable in Germany and Poland but has fluctuated considerably in Spain, Italy and France, particularly around the eurozone crisis of 2012.
Positive attitudes toward the EU are consistently stronger among younger people, those with higher incomes, those with higher levels of education, those who live in countries without major right-wing populist parties, and those who think their country’s economy is doing well. Poland’s extraordinarily high EU approval ratings reflect both the material benefits received from structural funds and market access, and the deep identification of many Poles with the European project as a marker of successful escape from Soviet domination. Ukraine’s 79% favourable view of the EU in 2019, recorded before the Russian invasion, is particularly striking and indicates the extent to which European orientation was already anchored in Ukrainian public opinion.
National conditions
Satisfaction with national conditions varies enormously across Europe. The Netherlands and Poland lead with roughly two-thirds satisfied with the direction of their country in 2019, while in France, Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, the UK and Greece large majorities are dissatisfied. Russia and Ukraine stand at 43% and 23% satisfied respectively.
Perhaps the most remarkable trend in this section of the data is the enormous shift in life satisfaction between 1991 and 2019 — measured as the proportion of respondents placing themselves at 7, 8, 9 or 10 on a ten-point ladder of life.
| Country | % highly satisfied, 1991 | 2019 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Poland | 12 | 56 | +44 |
| Hungary | 8 | 47 | +39 |
| Slovakia | 13 | 49 | +36 |
| Czech Republic | 23 | 57 | +34 |
| Lithuania | 13 | 44 | +31 |
| Bulgaria | 4 | 29 | +25 |
| Russia | 7 | 28 | +21 |
| Germany | 44 | 63 | +19 |
| Ukraine | 8 | 25 | +17 |
These are enormous shifts by the standards of comparative survey research, and they coexist with something apparently paradoxical: persistently high levels of external locus of control. Majorities or near-majorities in Slovakia (61%), Bulgaria (58%), Czech Republic (58%) and Poland (58%) agree that success in life is “pretty much determined by forces outside their control” — figures essentially indistinguishable from Greece (63%), which has not experienced communism but has had a very difficult economic experience since 2008. The coexistence of dramatically improved life satisfaction with persistent beliefs in external control is a phenomenon that the learned helplessness and relative deprivation frameworks help to make sense of.
Generational optimism about the future also distinguishes the region. Polish and Czech citizens are among the most optimistic in Europe on the question of whether children today will be better off financially than their parents — a finding that reflects the economic success of these countries since 1989, but also, perhaps, the baseline comparison: citizens whose parents grew up in communist poverty have a much lower benchmark against which to assess the next generation’s prospects.
Minority groups
The data on attitudes toward minority groups reveal one of the most striking and persistent divisions between Western and Central and Eastern Europe. Three minority groups show quite different patterns.
- Muslims. Attitudes are generally more favourable in Western Europe (and in Russia and Ukraine, where Muslim populations are long-established) and more negative in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe. Less favourable attitudes are associated with lower education, radical right-wing party support and older age.
- Jews. Attitudes are more uniformly positive across Europe, with increased favourable views documented over the past decade. Demographic differences are modest.
- Roma. Roma stand out for the deeply negative sentiments they attract. In 10 of 16 countries surveyed, half or more have unfavourable views of Roma.
| Country | Unfavourable view of Roma (%) | Favourable (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Italy | 83 | 14 |
| Slovakia | 76 | 21 |
| Greece | 72 | 25 |
| Bulgaria | 68 | 28 |
| Czech Republic | 66 | 27 |
| Hungary | 61 | 25 |
| Lithuania | 61 | 30 |
| Poland | 51 | 41 |
| France | 44 | 50 |
| Germany | 37 | 52 |
| Spain | 40 | 57 |
| UK | 23 | 60 |
| Netherlands | 30 | 66 |
| Sweden | 29 | 67 |
Education and ideology are the strongest predictors of attitudes toward Roma: those with more education and those who lean left tend to hold more favourable views. The stark gap between formal commitment to Roma rights as a matter of European law and the deeply negative attitudes revealed in survey data illustrates the implementation gap that characterises minority rights protection in post-communist Europe. In Slovakia and the Czech Republic, residential and school segregation, together with documented discrimination in employment and housing, coexist with legal frameworks that formally prohibit such treatment. Contact theory predicts that segregated, unequal and competitive contact of this kind is likely to exacerbate rather than reduce intergroup hostility.
Attitudes toward homosexuality
Attitudes toward whether homosexuality “should be accepted by society” reveal one of the sharpest cultural divides in contemporary Europe.
| Country | % should be accepted | % should not be accepted |
|---|---|---|
| Sweden | 94 | 5 |
| Netherlands | 92 | 8 |
| Spain | 89 | 10 |
| Germany | 86 | 11 |
| France | 86 | 11 |
| UK | 86 | 11 |
| Italy | 75 | 20 |
| Czech Republic | 59 | 26 |
| Hungary | 49 | 39 |
| Poland | 47 | 42 |
| Slovakia | 44 | 46 |
| Bulgaria | 32 | 48 |
| Lithuania | 28 | 45 |
| Ukraine | 14 | 69 |
| Russia | 14 | 74 |
The age gradient within post-communist countries is among the steepest in Europe. In Lithuania 45% of those aged 18–34 support acceptance versus only 9% of those aged 60 and over; in the Czech Republic the corresponding figures are 77% and 42%; in Poland, 57% and 28%. Religion and political affiliation matter strongly: those for whom religion is very or somewhat important are less likely to accept homosexuality, and supporters of right-wing populist parties are less accepting than other voters. These patterns are consistent with social identity and contact theory: the Church and conservative parties have mobilised anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment as a marker of in-group identity, while limited experience of genuine contact with openly LGBTQ+ individuals — especially in rural and religious communities — has left threat-based narratives unchallenged.
Russia is a cautionary case: even the youngest age group there shows only 25% acceptance. Where governments actively mobilise anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment as a political strategy, the generational shift otherwise visible in the data is slowed or reversed.
Gender equality
Gender equality presents a more complex and somewhat paradoxical picture. There is near-unanimity across all countries surveyed that it is important for women to have the same rights as men: even the lowest figures, in Lithuania and Ukraine, reach 88%. However, the intensity of commitment varies: in Sweden 96% say it is “very important”, in Poland only 69%, in Lithuania 62%.
The clearer shift concerns preferred marriage arrangements. The proportion preferring the traditional arrangement in which the husband provides and the wife cares for the home has fallen in every country surveyed between 1991 and 2019.
| Country | % preferring traditional marriage, 1991 | 2019 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hungary | 60 | 25 | –35 |
| Poland | 57 | 27 | –30 |
| Lithuania | 62 | 33 | –29 |
| Slovakia | 54 | 29 | –25 |
| Ukraine | 53 | 28 | –25 |
| Bulgaria | 40 | 16 | –24 |
| Czech Republic | 55 | 34 | –21 |
| Russia | 48 | 29 | –19 |
| France | 30 | 7 | –23 |
| Germany | 36 | 15 | –21 |
| UK | 28 | 17 | –11 |
In most countries younger people are considerably less likely to prefer traditional marriage arrangements, though Russia is a notable exception where the youngest age group actually shows slightly higher traditional preferences than the oldest — a pattern consistent with the political mobilisation of traditional values in Russia under Putin. The combination of near-universal formal endorsement of gender equality with continuing preferences for traditional arrangements among older and more religious citizens illustrates the cognitive dissonance dynamic that runs through many areas of post-communist value change: abstract normative commitments and concrete personal preferences operate in different cognitive registers and are not experienced as contradictory.
Trust
Survey data on trust in government and mainstream media reveal widespread scepticism in post-communist Europe, consistent with the social capital and learned helplessness frameworks.
| Country | % do not trust news from government | % trust |
|---|---|---|
| Slovakia | 72 | 21 |
| Romania | 70 | 24 |
| Bulgaria | 67 | 27 |
| Hungary | 63 | 28 |
| Poland | 63 | 29 |
| Czech Republic | 60 | 34 |
| Germany | 51 | 40 |
Even in Germany, which did not experience communism except in the eastern Länder, close to half of respondents do not trust the mainstream media. The connection between distrust of official information and the communist legacy is plausible: decades of systematic disinformation from state-controlled media trained citizens to assume that official information was propagandistic rather than accurate, and this habit of institutional distrust has proved durable long after the original institutions were reformed or replaced. The paradox of distrust in post-communist media environments is that it creates vulnerability to disinformation rather than immunity to it: citizens who have learned not to trust official sources do not necessarily develop better tools for evaluating information, and may simply substitute one kind of credulity for another. COVID-19 illustrated this dynamic sharply, with several post-communist countries showing both high distrust of official health information and high vulnerability to conspiracy theories circulating on social media.
Civil society
Attitudes toward civil society reveal a gap between formal support for its independence and scepticism about its relevance to ordinary citizens. Large majorities in most post-communist countries support the right of NGOs and charities to criticise the government (72% of Bulgarians, 70% of Poles, 66% of Romanians, 64% of Germans and Slovakians, 55% of Hungarians, 50% of Czechs), and even larger majorities support the right of academic institutions to do the same (82% of Bulgarians, 74% of Germans, 73% of Slovakians, 72% of Czechs, 71% of Hungarians and Poles, 70% of Romanians).
Charities are endorsed as a force for good by around two-thirds of the regional population, with Generation Z the most enthusiastic cohort — 86% in Slovakia, 80% in Bulgaria, 79% in Poland and 70% in the Czech Republic.
| Country | % saying civil society groups are interested in issues that ordinary people care about |
|---|---|
| Hungary | 50 |
| Bulgaria | 48 |
| Romania | 41 |
| Germany | 40 |
| Poland | 40 |
| Czech Republic | 36 |
| Slovakia | 35 |
This disconnect between abstract support for civil society and concrete scepticism about its relevance captures one of the most persistent features of post-communist civic culture: citizens value the idea of civil society as a democratic institution while remaining alienated from the specific organisations that constitute it. The finding that only 40% of Polish citizens think civil society groups are interested in issues ordinary people care about is particularly striking given Poland’s reputation as one of the stronger civil societies in the post-communist world.