The challenges of transition

• Post-communist transition was a project of great complexity
• Political
  • Creating democratic institutions, systems of representation, the rule of law, a functioning civil society, and integrating with international institutions.
• Economic
  • Liberalising economic activity, privatising state-held companies, dealing with the dislocations of transition for particular social and occupational groups, “catching up with the West”.
• Socio-cultural
  • Dealing with the impact of “Westernisation” at a time of significant political and material disruption.

Attitudes to transition

• 30 years after the beginning of transition to democracy, there is considerable support for a multi-party system and a market economy.
• However, there are significant differences:
  • Poland: 85% and 85%
  • Czech Republic: 82% and 76%
  • Hungary: 72% and 70%
  • Russia: 43% and 38%

Attitudes to transition

• These aggregate figures disguise significant socio-demographic differences.
  • In several countries, young people are more likely to approve of the movement towards a capitalist economy: e.g. Slovakia (84% aged 18–34, compared with 49% aged 60+).
  • Education also matters: those with higher levels of education are consistently more likely to express positive attitudes towards the move towards a capitalist economy, and towards a multiparty system.
  • The same is true of income levels: wealthier people are more likely to approve of the transition changes.

Democratic values

• Across Europe, there is relative agreement about which political institutions and rights are most important to have.
• When presented with nine different factors that people may or may not see as important to their country, majorities in every country say each one of the nine factors is at least somewhat important.
• However, Western Europeans generally are more likely to see each factor as very important for their country than are Central and Eastern Europeans.
• People with higher levels of education are more likely than those with less education to say almost all of these factors are very important for their country.

Democratic satisfaction

• Across Europe, satisfaction with democracy is mixed.
  • In Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland and Germany, roughly two-thirds or more are satisfied with the state of democracy in their country.
  • By contrast, in Greece, the UK, Italy, Spain and France, majorities are dissatisfied with how democracy is functioning.
• Across the six Central and Eastern European countries surveyed, satisfaction is somewhat higher.
  • But this varies from a high in Poland, where about two-thirds are satisfied, to a low of 27% in Bulgaria.
• Those with higher levels of education tend to be more satisfied with democracy than those with lower levels of schooling.

Attitudes towards the EU

• Across the 14 EU member countries surveyed, a median of 67% hold favourable views of the European Union while 31% have an unfavourable view.
• Many Central and Eastern European countries surveyed hold strongly positive views of the political union.
  • Roughly seven-in-ten or more in Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and nonmember Ukraine give the EU favourable marks.
  • While more people see the EU in a positive light than not in the UK, Greece, the Czech Republic and France, these countries also have sizeable portions of the public that voice negative opinions.

Attitudes towards the EU

• Positive attitudes towards the EU are stronger among:
  • younger people
  • those who have higher incomes
  • those who have higher levels of education (but not in all countries)
  • those who live in countries that do not have right-wing populist parties
  • those who think their country’s economic situation is good
  • those who think their country has benefited from European economic integration

National conditions

• In Greece, Bulgaria and the UK, about three-quarters or more are dissatisfied with the direction of their country, and roughly two-thirds or more are similarly dissatisfied in Italy, Spain and France.
• In the former Soviet republics of Russia and Ukraine, 50% and 66% are dissatisfied, respectively.
• In contrast, roughly two-thirds in the Netherlands and Poland and majorities in Sweden and Germany are satisfied with the direction of the country today.
• Those who are younger, better educated, on higher incomes, and whose preferred political party is in government are more likely to be satisfied with national conditions.

National conditions

% who say children today will be better off financially than their parents

Minority groups: Muslims

• There is a wide divergence across Europe in attitudes toward Muslims.
• Generally, more favourable views of Muslims exist in Western Europe, Russia and Ukraine while more negative attitudes persist in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe.
• Less favourable attitudes are more common among those who have lower levels of education, those who vote for radical right-wing parties, and among older people.

Minority groups: Jews

• Across the European countries surveyed, half or more express favourable views of Jews in their country.
• There have been increases in favourable attitudes towards Jews over the last 10 years.
• There are few demographic differences in attitudes toward Jews: those with more education tend to have more positive attitudes than do those with less education, though majorities at both levels have favourable views.

Minority groups: Roma

• Roma stand out for the negative sentiments expressed toward them.
• In 10 of the 16 countries polled, half or more have an unfavourable view of Roma.
• The strongest such anti-Roma sentiment is in Italy, where roughly eight-in-ten (83%) say they have unfavourable views of Roma.
• In general, those with more education and who are left-leaning in ideology tend to have more favourable opinions of Roma than those with less education or who are more right-leaning ideologically.

Minority groups: homosexuality

• When asked whether homosexuality should be accepted by society or not, there is a sharp divide between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe.
• Those who say religion is very or somewhat important in their lives are less likely to say homosexuality should be accepted by society.
• Age divides are particularly acute in CEE, with young people being far more likely to say that homosexuality should be accepted by society.
• There is also a political divide: those who support right-wing populist parties are more likely to say homosexuality should not be societally accepted.

Gender equality

• There is near unanimity in each of the countries surveyed that it is important for women to have the same rights as men.
• Nearly all people in Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Greece, Spain, the UK and Hungary hold this view.
• Even in the countries with the smallest share saying gender equality is important — Lithuania and Ukraine — roughly nine-in-ten (88%) believe this.

Trust

• A majority of respondents have a high level of scepticism about government and mainstream media trustworthiness.
• The highest level of distrust in government information was reported in Slovakia (72%), Romania (70%), Bulgaria (69%) and Hungary (63%).
• Even in Germany, almost half of the respondents said they did not trust the mainstream media (48%).

Civil society

• Public support for civil society and for the independence of its institutions from the state remains strong.
  • 72% of Bulgarians and 70% of Poles think NGOs and charities should be allowed to criticize the government; 66% of Romanians, 64% of Germans and Slovakians, a majority of Hungarians (55%) and half of Czechs.
  • A majority of respondents declared that academic institutions should be allowed to criticize the government, with 82% of Bulgarians, 74% of Germans, 73% of Slovakians, 72% of Czechs, 71% of Hungarians, 71% of Poles, and 70% of Romanians.

Civil society

• Large majorities endorse charities as the major force for good in their country (66%).
  • The most enthusiastic was the youngest generation, with 86% of Generation Z (born in or after 1997) in Slovakia thinking charities are a force for good.
  • This figure for Generation Z is 80% in Bulgaria, 79% in Poland, 70% in the Czech Republic, 65% in Romania, 61% in Germany, and 60% in Hungary.

Civil society

• Despite the positive attitudes in general towards civil society organisations, in most CEE countries only a minority of respondents think that civil society groups are interested in issues that ordinary people care about.
  • Hungary (50%), Bulgaria (48%), Romania (41%), Germany (40%), Poland (40%), Czech Republic (36%), Slovakia (35%).

Social identity theory: Reshaping identities

• Key empirical findings
  • Strong age divides in attitudes toward transition (e.g., Slovakia: 84% of young people vs. 49% of elderly support capitalism)
  • Generational gaps in attitudes toward homosexuality (e.g., Lithuania: 45% of 18–34 vs. 9% of 60+ support acceptance)
  • Ethnic attitudes differ significantly across countries (e.g., Roma acceptance versus rejection)
• Theoretical connection
  • Post-communist transition forced dramatic identity reconfiguration
  • Younger generations developed identities under new social categories
  • Older generations experienced identity threat when previously valued social categories lost status
  • Some social categories (e.g., Roma) remained outgroups across the transition process

System justification theory: Defending different systems

• Key empirical findings
  • Mixed support for democratic and market transitions (e.g., Russia: 43% and 38%)
  • Increased belief that “the state is run for the benefit of all people” in many countries
  • Growing satisfaction with democracy since 2009 (especially Lithuania, Hungary, Poland)
  • Stark differences in how “ordinary people benefited from changes” (21% in 2009, rising to 41% in 2019)
• Theoretical connection
  • Citizens rationalise aspects of both old and new systems
  • Economic winners more likely to justify new system
  • Status-threatened groups (elderly, less educated) more likely to justify previous system
  • System justification visible in shifting evaluations of pre/post-transition periods

Social learning theory: Adaptive behaviours

• Key empirical findings
  • Large generational differences in democratic values (Western Europe vs. CEE gap)
  • Persistent distrust of government information (63–72% in several CEE countries)
  • Paradoxical attitudes toward civic engagement (support for NGOs but scepticism about relevance)
  • Continued external locus of control (50–63% agree success is determined by outside forces)
• Theoretical connection
  • Different generations observed and learned different models of political behaviour
  • Limited models of democratic participation during transition
  • Learned behaviours of institutional distrust persist despite regime change
  • Younger generations acquiring new participatory behaviours through different models

Learned helplessness theory: Control and agency

• Key empirical findings
  • Majority in many countries believe success is determined by forces outside their control
  • Strong external attribution especially in CEE (58–63% in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland)
  • Generational differences in economic optimism (more positive among youth)
  • Gender role attitudes shifting from traditional models to more egalitarian arrangements
• Theoretical connection
  • Communist experience created conditions for political helplessness
  • Economic volatility during transition reinforced external attribution
  • Younger generations show less evidence of learned helplessness
  • Economic growth associated with declining helplessness measures

Relative deprivation theory: Shifting reference points

• Key empirical findings
  • Strong correlation between GDP and life satisfaction (r = +0.90)
  • Dramatic increases in life satisfaction since 1991 (e.g., Poland +44, Hungary +39)
  • Mixed views on whether children will be better off (higher in East, lower in West)
  • EU support strongest in countries that received significant financial benefits
• Theoretical connection
  • Post-communist transition created new reference groups for comparison
  • “Catching up with the West” created framework for relative deprivation
  • Temporal comparisons (now vs. communist era) remain salient
  • EU membership provided new framework for evaluating relative status

Contact theory: Intergroup relations

• Key empirical findings
  • Striking differences in attitudes toward minority groups (Muslims, Roma)
  • Western Europe generally more accepting of homosexuality than CEE
  • Strong regional differences in attitudes toward Roma (Western vs. Eastern Europe)
  • Education level strongly predicts more positive outgroup attitudes
• Theoretical connection
  • Limited positive contact conditions during communist era
  • New opportunities for contact after borders opened
  • Educational settings providing structured contact opportunities
  • Generational differences reflect different contact experiences
  • EU integration facilitating more optimal contact conditions

Terror management theory: Existential security

• Key empirical findings
  • Higher religiosity associated with more traditional social views
  • Stronger support for traditional gender roles in CEE countries
  • Age effects on social attitudes particularly pronounced in formerly communist societies
  • EU support linked to perceptions of economic security
• Theoretical connection
  • Transition created profound existential insecurity
  • Traditional values and nationalism offered anxiety buffer
  • Religious identity provided continuity amidst change
  • Support for strong leadership correlated with economic uncertainty
  • Different generations experience different levels of mortality salience

Collective memory theory: Interpreting the past

• Key empirical findings
  • Mixed evaluations of transition outcomes (21% to 41% positive assessment, 2009–2019)
  • Beliefs about whether ordinary people benefited show strong generational differences
  • Different patterns of EU support based on historical experiences
  • Satisfaction with democracy improving as temporal distance from communism increases
• Theoretical connection
  • Competing narratives about the communist period (totalitarian vs. welfare state)
  • Memory politics as political resource (e.g., attitudes toward EU membership)
  • Generational memory differences shape political attitudes
  • Collective memory influences interpretations of current inequalities

Social capital theory: Trust and networks

• Key empirical findings
  • Persistent low trust in government (e.g., 60–72% distrust in CEE)
  • Media scepticism widespread (48% distrust even in Germany)
  • Strong support for civil society independence (70–80% support right to criticize)
  • Disconnect between support for civil society and belief in its relevance to ordinary people
• Theoretical connection
  • Communist regimes undermined bridging social capital
  • Strong bonding capital (family, close friends) but weak bridging capital
  • Democracy requires specific forms of social capital still developing
  • Trust deficit lingers despite institutional change
  • Generation Z more supportive of civil society (60–86% across countries)

Cognitive dissonance theory: Reconciling contradictions

• Key empirical findings
  • Support for both gender equality (88–99%) and some traditional gender roles
  • Decline in traditional marriage models across all countries (e.g., Hungary: 60% to 25%)
  • Democratic values supported while institutions often distrusted
  • EU viewed favourably despite scepticism about certain policies
• Theoretical connection
  • Transition created massive dissonance between old and new value systems
  • Generational differences in dissonance reduction strategies
  • Selective acceptance of democratic principles that align with pre-existing values
  • Compartmentalisation of contradictory attitudes (e.g., supporting equality while maintaining prejudice)